France

Central to the French political context is the upcoming presidential election of April 2022, after five years of a government headed by President Emmanuel Macron. December 2021’s electoral polls announced that around 32% of the voters intend to put a ballot for one of the leading far-right candidates (M. Le Pen 16%, E. Zemmour 14%, N. Dupont-Aignan 2%) – to be compared with 18% shared among six left-wing candidates, 19% for V. Pécresse, candidate of the right-wing party Les Républicains (LR) and 23% for E. Macron. While polls remain uncertain, France surely witnesses a rise of the far-right in the political landscape as well as a worrying expansion of far-right themes, such as immigration, identity, and security, in the public debate beyond the scope of traditional far-right actors as exemplified during the debates for the primary of the right-wing party LR.

Current Situation 

Introduction

Introduction

Central to the French political context is the upcoming presidential election of April 2022, after five years of a government headed by President Emmanuel Macron. December 2021’s electoral polls announced that around 32% of the voters intend to put a ballot for one of the leading far-right candidates (M. Le Pen 16%, E. Zemmour 14%, N. Dupont-Aignan 2%) – to be compared with 18% shared among six left-wing candidates, 19% for V. Pécresse, candidate of the right-wing party Les Républicains (LR) and 23% for E. Macron. While polls remain uncertain, France surely witnesses a rise of the far-right in the political landscape as well as a worrying expansion of far-right themes, such as immigration, identity, and security, in the public debate beyond the scope of traditional far-right actors as exemplified during the debates for the primary of the right-wing party LR.

The Covid-19 pandemic and the ensuing lock-down measures put an abrupt end to a wave of social protest, epitomising the Yellow Vests (Gilets Jaunes) movement in late 2018 and stretching throughout 2019 with convergence with social revendications of the climate movement, opposing Macron’s neoliberal agenda. Emmanuel Macron’s government has indeed been criticised for exacerbating social and economic inequalities (for example ending wealth tax while reducing housing benefits and wishing to reform the pension system) while simultaneously using authoritarian measures and laws, as shown by the repression of the social contestations/demonstrations of the last five years and more (the Yellow Vests but also in Notre-Dame-des-Landes…), and the “global security law” giving more power to the Police, for example.  

This combination of the propagation of antisemitic, anti-immigration, anti-Islam (amplified by the 2015 terrorist attacks), anti-“leftism” (and “anti-Islam-leftism”) discourses coming from the (far-)right end of the political spectrum, together with the accentuation of neoliberal-authoritarian turn of Macron’s government has led authors to speak about the current period a one of “fascination”, in which the figure of presidential candidate Eric Zemmour (to the right of Marine Le Pen) is a symbol.

Britain continues to occupy six counties in the north of Ireland, although it is believed this occupation will end at some point in the next few decades, following an agreement which will end British rule if a majority vote for it in a referendum. Within Britain, there have been repeated calls for Scottish and Welsh independence, which mean the breakup of the United Kingdom is a possibility, particularly after the death of the current Queen.

While nationalism, militarism and hostility to immigrants are rife, Britain is also one of the most socially progressive countries in the world, with many forms of oppressive behaviour criminalised. This tension over cultural attitudes is highlighted by the current arguments over trans rights, with some prominent British feminists adopting transphobic positions in response to a growing number of young people identifying as trans.

The current government’s frequent attacks on human rights are vocally opposed by large sections of the population who do not feel represented by those in power.

Parliamentary landscape

Parliamentary landscape

On the one hand, the French far-right is present and active on the parliamentary scene through political parties and figures running at the local, regional, national, and European elections. The popularity of Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN), formerly known as Front National (FN), has significantly grown in the last decade, leading Le Pen to reach second place in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections with 21,3% of the votes behind Emmanuel Macron (24%) (17,9% in 2012). In both the 2014 and 2019 elections to the European Parliament, the FN/RN reached first place, with respectively 24,9% and 23,3% of the votes. Debout La France (DLF), led by Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, is the second main party considered far-right. However, it only reached 4,7% in 2017, and its popularity has decreased even more since then. Les Patriotes (LP), created by Florian Philippot when splitting from the RN in 2017, has been electorally unsuccessful. Yet, it attempted to have a leading role in contesting the restrictive measures related to the Covid-19 pandemic.

In 2021, the French Parliament (Assemblée Nationale) counted nine far-right members out of 577 seats (6 RN members, two from Debout la France (DLF), and one non-affiliated). At the Senate, two members represent the far right (one RN and one DLF) out of 358. At the EU Parliament, the French far-right occupies 23 seats out of 79 dedicated to the country and out of 705 overall. The RN Members of the EU Parliament (MEPs) are part of the Identity and Democracy (ID) group.

Despite its direct neo-fascist origins, the RN has engaged with a “de-demonization” strategy, especially since Marine Le Pen took over the party’s leadership in 2011. Moving away from the negationist and racist reputation of her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the party has managed to become more normalised and to gain legitimacy. The RN still uses an anti-Brussels and pro-sovereignty rhetoric but has dropped its wish for a “Frexit”, leaving these more Eurosceptic stances to smaller marginal parties such as F. Philippot’s LP or F. Asselineau’s Union Populaire Républicaine (UPR). Denouncing immigration and Islam has remained central to the RN. Still, the polishing of this discourse, too, has left a space for the (re-)emergence of less filtered rhetoric embodied by E. Zemmour and his supporters.

At the end of November 2021, E. Zemmour announced he would run for the presidential elections and created a party, “Reconquête !” in the following days, claiming 75,000 members by December 30. Journalist and TV columnist, his popularity surged as he started appearing on the channel CNews in 2019, where he was given a daily platform for his xenophobic speech. He has been convicted for racial discrimination (2011) and for incitement to hate towards Muslims (2018), as the amalgam between immigration, Islam, and crime is a constant theme. His sudden success can be both explained by a self-feeding media bubble and hype around the speculation of his candidacy, but also because he aims to gather a broad right-wing electorate around his fascist rhetoric of ethnicity-based re-generation of the greatness of the French nation currently devastated by uncontrolled non-white immigration. E. Zemmour is also known for his misogyny and opposition to same-sex marriage.

The other side of the far-right coin takes place in the extra-parliamentary scene. The porosity between the two is evident, with actual revolving doors between activism and positions in the parties (Damien Rieu, for example, founder of Génération Identitaire, RN candidate at local elections, and parliamentary assistant of RN executives). Most importantly, the extra-parliamentary far-right contributes to the diffusion of far-right discourses and violence.

Extra-parliamentary landscape

Extra-parliamentary landscape

Far-right groups proliferate and thrive outside of the parliamentary arena. On the more presentable side, one finds a variety of conservative think tanks and institutes that mainly aim to spread knowledge and intellectually train both the young and adult public through seminars, colloquiums, publications, and the like (Institut Iliade, Institut de Formation Politique (IFP), Carrefour de l’Horloge, Polémia…). Marion Maréchal (ex-Le Pen) founded a private graduate school in Lyon (ISSEP). This sphere believes in the need for a cultural battle to induce change at the political level.

Others advertise themselves as youth organisations and host regular events and summer camps (Academia Christiana, Action Française, Génération Identitaire formerly…). Most groups organise themselves into local sections, and some even have premises with a bar or sports training room (boxing) and attempt to get attention through symbolic actions (blocking a border, occupying a mosque, banner drop…). Even if national or local groups are punctually dissolved, the same activists usually reunite under another name and continue their activities (for example, the Groupe Union Défense (GUD), then Bastion Social). These political groups can also take the shape of a student union, such as in the case of La Cocarde Étudiante implemented in several universities. Some activists of these groups are also active in street activism, assaulting left-wing activists as well as trade unions and antifascist premises.

Whether these groups are identitarian, royalist, or catholic-fundamentalist, they function as a network and share an ethnic-nationalist ideology, opposing immigration and Islam perceived as a part of an invasion of a territory where they do not belong. These motivations are often combined with homophobia and transphobia, perceived as a threat to the family core and thought of as the means for the perpetuation of heritage and identity. Conspiracy theories such as “the Great Replacement”, which denounces a supposed replacement of the European peoples by a non-white Muslim population, are often celebrated. Therefore, it is unsurprising that many see a providential candidate in E. Zemmour and his “remigration” discourse. His first political meeting on December 5th, 2021, included a compilation of far-right groups and figures. It resulted in the violent assault of anti-racist activists who were conducting a peaceful action.

The extra-parliamentary far-right goes way beyond formal groups. Hooligans organise fights among each other and celebrate Nazi symbols. Violent groupuscules are also on the rise, and ultra-right terror has become a high source of concern for the authorities as they foiled several attacks in recent years. Journalists have also revealed the presence of non-isolated neo-Nazis in the army as well as the banality of racist and antisemitic comments among some Policemen. In April 2021, former army generals published a tribune to urge President Macron to counter militarily the downfall of France due to immigrants and antiracism. Other radical groups move towards survivalism, aiming at creating white autonomous communities to prepare for a civilisation crash induced by an inevitable racial war that has already started. The accelerationist doctrine even advocates for racial-based violence to “accelerate” its occurrence and begin anew.

Social media undoubtedly play a significant role in both the radicalisation of individuals and the structuration of groups (Telegram, Discord, Twitter, Gettr…). Youtubers such as Papacito and Baptiste Marchais constantly joke about violently targeting leftists, and others use communication platforms to directly call to murder specific politicians or journalists. But far-right narratives can also count on a wide range of media outlets to disseminate and normalise them: magazines such as (Boulevard Voltaire, Présent, Éléments, Causeur, L’Incorrect, Valeurs Actuelles…), radio channels (Méridien Zéro, Radio Courtoisie…), web TV (TV Libertés…), “re-information” websites (Novopress, Riposte Laïque, Dreuz…); to mention a few.

International relationships

International relationships

On a parliamentary level, Marine Le Pen mainly attempts to ally with her European counterparts from nationalist parties (especially Poland, Hungary, and Italy), as they share a common vision of a European Union of sovereign nations. In a similar mindset, antisemitic activist Yvan Benedetti collaborates with other nationalist entities or micro-parties in Europe. On an extra-parliamentary level, many formal and informal connections take place.  The identitarian movement has spread in Europe, and branches of Génération Identitaire (dissolved in 2021 in France) are still active in Austria, Denmark, and Belgium. These and similar groups usually help each other out by participating in each other’s events and relaying information. They also get inspiration from each other, just as the Bastion Social and its heirs copied the celebrated model of the neo-fascist organisation CasaPound in Italy. Others try to build a European-wide network, such as the white supremacist Daniel Conversano and his Les Braves organisation. More formally, Marion Maréchal has, for example, created partnerships and branches of her graduate school in Madrid, hand in hand with neo-Francoists close to Vox, Santiago Abascal’s party, but also in Poland, Russia and Lebanon. More generally, the Nouvelle Droite movement started in the late 1960s. It advocated a battle of ideas opposing both liberalism and capitalism and promoting a very organicist vision of the society, which has found intellectual resonance at the European level and beyond (especially in Italy and in Germany).

Antifascist landscape

Antifascist landscape

The antifascist movement is still marked by the recent death of the antifascist activist Clément Méric in 2013 during a fight caused by neo-Nazis of Serge Ayoub’s Jeunesses Nationales Révolutionnaires (JNR, dissolved afterwards). The Antifa movement is organised into local independent groups. In 2018, the Jeune Guarde was created in Lyon, intending to take back the streets and reflect on a more inclusive antifascist struggle, giving a new youth kick and emphasising an anti-capitalist standpoint – it counted five sections in December 2021. La Horde regularly reports on the far-right at a national level and relays information from local sections. It is also known for its yearly map of far-right actors and campaigning material. Antifascist activists are at the forefront of far-right monitoring and opposition and can rely on allied local media to publish their findings. A more formal structure, the National Observatory of the Far-right (ONED), was founded in 2020 around politicians, academics, syndicalists, and activists. It aims to monitor the far right and produce informative literature.

Another hub of antifascist action lies in trade unions. Symbolic antifascist actors work towards more training and information campaigns against far-right discourses. Sexist, racist, homophobic, and Islamophobic ideas can only divide the already weakened labour force and are in clear opposition to the anti-capitalist struggle against the dominant classes, a struggle based on values of solidarity and equality. VISA (Vigilance et Initiatives Syndicales Antifascistes) is a national intersyndicalist organisation that gathers about a hundred unions. It conducts syndicalist antifascist training and documentation. The organisation works closely with the internal working groups in the fight against the far right in the professional world at the CGT, one of the leading trade unions, and at Solidaires, which is also engaged in the counter-far proper fight.

Additionally, academics such as Nonna Mayer, Nicolas Lebourg, Jean-Yves Camus, Jean-Paul Gautier, Michel Winock, and Stéphane François, to mention a few, have in the last decades produced critical historical analysis of the French far-right, both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary.

Reports

Quarterly Reports

Quarterly reports give in-depth insights into the most pressing recent social and political developments in each country as they pertain to the local far-right networks and their international allies.

France - February 2022
France - February 2022

Key developments
On the parliamentary scene, the race for the presidential elections (10th and 24th of April) continues, just as the fluctuations in the polls that go with it. Florian Philippot, leader of Les Patriotes and a front personality of the anti-covid pass movement is no longer a candidate. Nor is François Asselineau (Union Populaire Républicaine, UPR) who failed to collect the 500 support signatures needed to compete. During February, more Rassemblement National (RN) executives have left the party to join Éric Zemmour’s campaign, including Stéphane Ravier, the only Senator of the party, and Nicolas Bay, European MP, accused of communicating strategic information to the Zemmour campaign. Éric Zemmour furthermore happily reported to have spoken to a supportive Donald Trump on the phone on February 15th.
In the wake of the billionaire businessman Vincent Bolloré acquiring more and more media in the last decade, therefore endangering the plurality of opinions and consequently the democratic debate, this article from ACRIMED, the critical observatory of media, reports on the normalisation and “mainstreamisation” of far-right themes in the public debate. The latest example might be when the candidate of the right-wing party (Les Républicains, LR) Valérie Pécresse, openly spoke about the existence of a “Great Replacement” at her political meeting in Paris on February 13, referring to the conspiracy theory popularised by the French author Renaud Camus, denouncing an alleged ongoing replacement of the white European peoples by non-white extra-European populations.
On the extra-parliamentary scene, February 6th saw its yearly commemorations. This date is symbolic for the far right for two reasons. First, because of the events of February 6th 1934, when right-wing and far-right anti-parliamentarian groups demonstrated in Paris against the new government, which had just dismissed the Paris Police Commissioner, known to be far right friendly. The demonstrations escalated and a dozen of people died, mainly demonstrators, and this event is often thought of as an attempt from fascists to overthrow the Republic, in a context of Mussolini and Hitler already in power in neighbouring countries. Second, on February 6th, but in 1945 this time, Robert Brasillach, antisemitic writer and journalist, was executed because of his collaboration with the Nazi regime. Far-right groups continue to commemorate “their” deaths on that date, through demonstrations and gatherings on Brasillach’s grave.
On another note, the foundation Polémia, headed by Jean-Yves le Gallou, held its yearly (since 2010) parodic event on February 7th of “Bobard d’Or” (Golden lies awards) supposedly denouncing “fake news” by mainstream media and the occasion to gather the far-right bourgeoisie in a Parisian theatre to feed their narrative of the alleged corruptness and unreliability of mainstream media, while promoting the need for their task of “re-information”.
Ukraine-Russia conflict
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has shaken the Russia-friendly positions on the French far right. The Rassemblement National (RN) has historically supported closer relations with the Kremlin and high-executives of the party have regularly visited Russia and Marine Le Pen herself was officially welcomed by Vladimir Putin in 2017, before the presidential elections. The RN has moreover reportedly received loans from Russian oligarchs and banks both in 2014 and 2017 to finance the EU and presidential campaigns respectively. Journalist have highlighted the connection between the RN’s positive attitude towards the Russian annexing of Crimea in 2014, and the allowance of a loan a few months later – refuted by Marine Le Pen, who justified it by her inability to be granted a loan from French banks. Mediapart especially highlights the role of Konstantin Malofeev in the financing of the party, but this oligarch is also close to other far-right personalities in France and beyond, such as Philippe de Villiers.
Éric Zemmour has voiced a similar support to the Putin regime in the past, in line with a general fascination for the authoritarian and sovereignist leader among the far-right. Neither him nor Marine Le Pen believed in the accuracy of an imminent invasion, and, even more in the context of the 2022 presidential elections, were forced to operate a 180 degree turn on their positions from the first days of the attacks. Despite the strict condemnation of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the narrative remains one that portrays Putin as a victim of NATO’s expansion. As expressed by Éric Zemmour, Putin is the “only guilty one”, but not “the only responsible one”. Similarly, Paul Marie Couteaux, a former Front National (FN) executive and today in the closest circles of Éric Zemmour, affirmed that Putin was led to invade Ukraine by the humiliation caused by NATO, and that the war is primarily serving US interests.
Additionally, while Éric Zemmour strongly prefers to restrict Ukrainian immigration by supporting the direct neighbour countries, the RN is instrumentalising the crisis to give a more humanist image to the party: Louis Aliot, RN mayor of Perpignan, exemplifies the double standard discourse regarding refugees. He went to Lviv in person to welcomed refugees from Ukraine, and turned of course the event into a public relation campaign. Last August, the RN was rather busy with organising a petition against the welcoming of Afghan refugees.
On the extra-parliamentary far right, there is a dominant support to Ukraine among nationalist groups such as Luminis Paris, Bordeaux Nationalistes, Les Zouaves Paris, Les Braves, Lyon Populaire. They have organised collects of money and goods for Ukraine. However, the support is unsurprisingly channelled towards Ukrainian ultranationalist groups such as the Azov movement and regiment, known for its neo-Nazi ideology – an ongoing and underlying support since the start of the war in Dombass in 2014. The leader of Zouaves Paris, Marc de Cacqueray-Valmenier, had been to Ukraine in 2019 and met with Azov members. However, Streetpress had also reported in 2016 on the involvement of (at least) 23 French far-right activists who had joined the battleground on the pro-Russian separatist since 2014.
A group that stands out by its unequivocally pro-Russian position is Les Nationalistes and the rest of the bubble revolving around Yvan Benedetti. He has described Ukraine as “an artificial country”, supporting a re-organisation of the borders according to “historic realities”.
In short, despite various and contradictory positions at times, the war in Ukraine is instrumentalised to serve typical and historical far-right narratives, whether it is islamophobia targeting the Chechen troops sent by Putin, or antisemitism when portraying the war as yet another action of the Judaic world order/globalist elites trying to operate a “Great reset” to better fool and control people. Moreover, the admiration for the Ukrainian resistance also feeds hyper-masculinist and ultra-nationalist tropes of European territorial defence in front of an othered enemy. Additionally, the overwhelming support to welcome Ukrainians fleeing the war is of course to be celebrated. Yet is also shows a racist judging of who is “a good” refugee and who is not, as shown in the treatment of non-white people also fleeing the war in Ukraine, and more generally by the previous attitude to refugees fleeing the middle east or African countries, also at war.
Lastly, the support for support for Ukrainian troops and people has led to collaboration among far-right European groups. This is best exemplified by the Identitarians, who, at the initiative of Generation Identity Denmark, organised food and basic care products collection and brought it to Budapest, where they celebrated the cooperation from activists from France, Hungary, Germany and Denmark to help Ukrainian refugees who had arrived in the Hungarian capital.

France - January 2022
France - January 2022

Key developments
In January 2022, Eric Zemmour’s popularity seems to have lost its momentum and rather decreases, as he now ranks 4th according to the latest polls for the upcoming presidential elections in April this year. Nevertheless, this month has seen several personalities leaving their respective parties to join Zemmour’s ranks, including the second-highest executive of the right-wing party Les Républicains (LR) and three key Rassemblement National (RN) executives, one of them being Damien Rieu (Damien Lefèvre), RN member and figure of the French Identitarian movement. Marion Maréchal (ex-Le Pen) also quietly voiced her support for the Reconquête! candidate, despite her historical family connection with the RN. More defections are expected, what testifies, besides political opportunism, of Zemmour’s success to pull the political debate further to the right and comes to shake the “de-evilised” façade of the RN. It also shows a certain success of Reconquête!’s strategy to “unify the Rights”, around an educated bourgeois and masculine crowd who funds the movement, benefiting from the support from the identitarian scene.
Eric Zemmour was convicted this month for the third time for incitement to hate and violence based on one’s origins, as he described immigrating unaccompanied minors as “thieves”, “rapists” and “murderers” in 2020. He awaits another trial for contesting a crime against humanity as he claims that Pétain, who collaborated under German occupation during World war two, “saved Jews”.
On January 5, Les Zouaves, a violent activist group, reportedly involved in the assault of anti-racist activists at Zemmour’s first campaign meeting in December 2021, was dissolved by the French government for incitement to hate and violence and spread racist and neo-Nazi ideologies. This did not prevent its reported leader Marc de Cacqueray-Valmenier to participate in an anti-covid vaccination pass demonstration in Paris, which led to his incarceration as he was not allowed to attend such an event due to his conviction in a different legal case.
January 15 and 16 were indeed the theatre of several demonstrations with a strong far-right presence. Saturday 15, Florian Philippot (Les Patriotes) called for an anti-covid vaccination pass demonstration in Paris. Identitarians, nationalists and hooligan groups attended and even formed their own section in the demonstration. They named it “White block” and claimed on the Telegram channel Ouest Casual to have gathered 200 activists (see picture 1). During this demonstration, AFP journalists were assaulted and insulted. As we enter 2022 with new far-right violence, check out Rapports de Force’s updated 2021 map of far-right violence.
Later that day, the organisation Paris Fierté, close to the dissolved Génération Identitaire, organised its yearly torchlight procession to celebrate the protector of Paris, Saint Geneviève. This march was clearly organised by former Génération Identitaire members but seemingly tolerated by the authorities despite the dissolution of the organisation in March 2021. The next day, on Sunday 16, the yearly “March for Life” demonstration took place in Paris too, gathering traditional conservative anti-abortion activists, but also the more radical far-right fringe such as the nationalist and antisemitic Yvan Benedetti (see picture 2) or the organisation Civitas.
International links
Jordan Bardella, RN president during Marine Le Pen’s campaign, complimented the Portuguese André Ventura for rising to third place with its party Chega at the recent legislative elections. At this time, on January 29, Marine Le Pen attended a two-day summit in Madrid with her European counterparts to discuss further the terms of creating a broader far-right/populist alliance within the EU. This gathering, led by the party Vox, was a third of the kind, after being initiated in July 2021 and continued in Warsaw in early December. The goal is to reform the EU in order to reinforce national sovereignty and traditional conservative values.
The student union La Cocarde Étudiante, inaugurated an official alliance with two other European student unions: the Spanish Revolution, and the Italian FUAN-Azione Universitaria. The aim is to defend the European Universities and youth against a perceived left-wing cultural hegemony.

France - December 2021
France - December 2021

Key developments

On December 5th, Eric Zemmour held his first political meeting to kick off his campaign in Paris, in front of 13 000 participants, including politicians and identitarian figures officially displaying their support to the new candidate. At the event, anti-racist activists were violently attacked as they conducted a peaceful action (i.e. shouting “no to racism!” wearing t-shirts with this slogan). Members of the ultra-right violent group Les Zouaves Paris counted among the assailants, and two of them have been arrested since then. Interior Minister Gerald Darmanin has reportedly started a dissolution procedure against the group. Eric Zemmour has not denounced the violent actions from his supporters.
On December 20th, a new violent video was revealed by an antifascist leader. The video shows Zemmour’s supporters practicing shooting. Their supposed targets: named left-wing members of Parliament, Emmanuel Macron, antifa, “leftists” and Muslim foreigners whom they insult with racist comments. Eric Zemmour made an official press release to distance himself from the video and its creators, in which he however simultaneously targeted the antifas allegedly “harassing” him. The two men shown in the video have been identified and will be judged early next year.
A new branch of the international Mototcycle Club (MC) Les Bandidos is reported to have settled in Besançon. Members directly come from the neo-Nazi scene and more precisely from the group Combat 18 (dissolved in 2019), which claimed to be the armed group of Blood and Honour, an international neo-Nazi organisation. The Bettoni brothers, former leaders of Combat 18 seem to be behind this new local branch.
 

International links

On December 3rd and 4th, Marine Le Pen went to Warsaw to meet her other leaders of European nationalist parties at the invitation of Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki (PiS). This was the follow-up of a meeting earlier this year which aimed to initiate a new alliance between a dozen of Conservative parties at the European Parliament. The hope is to bring together the Identity and Democracy, ID, (which includes the RN and la Salvini’s Ligua) and the European Conservative and Reformists group (PiS, Fratelli d’Italia) and the non-affiliated Hungarian Fidesz members, to create an greater nationalist and conservative political force at the EU Parliament.
On December 12th, Yvan Benedetti (Jeune Nation and Les Nationalistes), gave an online conference to the Portuguese nationalist movement Força Nova (see picture 1).
Les Braves, (Conversano) inaugurated two new national sections in Russia and Ukraine. (see pictures 2 and 3).

France - November 2021
France - November 2021

Key developments

  • On November 2, StreetPress revealed that supporters of Eric Zemmour practiced shooting on racist caricature targets (a black man, a Muslim, a Jew).
  • On November 5, as a response to StreetPress’ article, a far-right Telegram channel published a photomontage with pictures or caricatures of left-wing journalists and politicians (among others), with a red target on their forehead. Alongside the message provides a link to a website where one can legally buy weapons. Claims have been filed to the police.
  • Between November 4-7, a catholic-fundamentalist training camp for young men between 16 and 23 years old was held near Orléans. The “Camps des Hussards” was led by Abbot Matthieu Raffray, a figure of the far-right catholic-fundamentalist sphere. On the program for the weekend, only manly activities: “fight, fight, pray”. Baptiste Marchais, a far-right youtuber was also present.
  • On November 17, the local organisation Alvarium in Angers was dissolved by the French government, on the basis of inciting to discrimination and violence, notably through the promotion of an amalgam between immigration, Islam and terrorism, spreading a xenophobic ideology through connections with other similar groups.
  • On November 23, 13 far-right activists were arrested as they planned violent actions. They were part of a wider network called “Recolonisation France” and which had a least 4 regional entities. This group promotes an identitarian, racist and survivalist ideology, and had already gathered many weapons and called for the formation or armed action groups. Telegram was used as a means to recruit new members, as well as personalities of the far right such as “Monsieur K”, close in the past to Alain Soral (Égalité et Réconciliation)
  • On November 20, the Collectif Nemesis, a far-right “feminist” group (anti-Islam and immigration) was present at the feminist demonstration to protest against violence against women. As they tried to be silenced, trouble arose and their masculine defenders from La Cocarde Étudiante (student union) and Action Française got into a fight.
  • On November 20, a customs investigation led the Police to inspect the residence of a person where they found over 130 weapons as well as neo-Nazi propaganda. An accomplice, an active soldier from the French army, was already been denounced by Mediapart’s investigation earlier this year for his public display of Nazi symbols.
  • On November 27, the Foundation Polemia, founded notably by Jean-Yves Le Gallou, held its 7th Forum of dissidence, featuring the sociologist Michel Maffesoli and Nicolas Faure (Sunrise Media), among others. The theme was “You are the majority, they are the extremists!” (See picture 1).
  • On November 30, Eric Zemmour finally announced he will run for the 2022 presidential elections, with a dramatic video combining a speech and images on the downfall of France.
     

    International links

  • Between November 19-21, Yvan Benedetti organized and led a trip to “nationalist Spain” in order to celebrate the anniversary of the death of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera on November 19th, founder of the Falange Española (see Pictures 2 and 3).
  • Les Braves opened a new section in Croatia (See Picture 4) and were present in Warsaw, Poland on November 11 for the Nationalist march and celebration (see picture 5)
France - October 2021
France - October 2021

Key developments

  • On October 2nd a 19-year-old was arrested as he had planned to commit terrorist attacks on two mosques and his former high school, on April 20, 2022, Hitler’s birthday. This article on Mediapart gives more context on the accelerationist doctrine behind such deadly projects (the aim being to trigger a racial civil war, thought as inevitable, therefore the need to accelerate its occurrence in order to start anew).
  • Eric Zemmour, still not officially a candidate for the presidential elections, keeps rising in election polls and occupying media space to spread his hateful speeches. He also continues his book release tour, considered by many as a (not so well) disguised campaign. Mediapart revealed his connections and organizational support from well-known far-right groups such as the monarchist organization Action Française.
  • Interior Minister Gerald Darmanin has started a procedure to dissolve the organization Alvarium in Angers, born in the wake of the Bastion Social (dissolved in 2019) and close to other organizations such as Génération Identitaire (dissolved in 2021).
  • Far-right violence has increased in the last few months. This can be partly explained by the numerous weekly demonstrations against covid measures and the vaccine obligation/covid-pass, where the far-right has been very present. Here is the map of far-right violence.
  • On October 28th Rémi Daillet, the figure of conspiracy movements connected to the Honneur et Nation neonazi group was now been charged for terrorism as he was involved with the coordination of a 300 people network (organized in local entities) eventually planning a coup. Its “operation Azul” counted vaccination centers, 5G towers, a masonic lodge, and journalists among its numerous targets.
     

    International links

  • On September 25th, members of Jeune Nation (a group led by Yvan Benedetti) were in Sofia, Bulgaria to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the National Bulgarian Union. Recently they have shown their support against the banning of the organization.
  • Marion Maréchal formalized yet another partnership between her graduate school ISSEP and, this time, the Collegium Intermarium in Warsaw, Poland. They indeed share “the same ambition to train a new generation of executives who serve and defend the European heritage and the freedom of Nations” (see Picture 1).
  • Les Braves, Daniel Conversano’s organization started an English Telegram channel in order to attract a wider community. The organization is spreading across Europe, as shown by their map of local groups. It advertised in this logic its upcoming participation in the 11th November demonstration in Warsaw along with Polish Nationalists, to celebrate the anniversary of Poland’s independence (see Pictures 2 and 3).
  • Thais d’Escufon, the former spokesperson of Génération Identitaire, was once again the guest on Martin Sellner (Generation Identity Austria)’s show to speak about Eric Zemmour, whom she supports.
  • Jordan Bardella, RN president, was present at the launch of a new far-right party in Belgium: Chez Nous, along with Tom Van Grieken, the president of the Vlaams Belang (see Picture 4).
  • On October 26ht Marine le Pen, RN and presidential candidate, met Viktor Orban in Hungary to reaffirm their ideological proximity against immigration, EU regulations, and for an alliance of Nations in Europe (see Picture 5)
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Analysis