The change of power resulting from the 2013-2014 Euromaidan protests, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation, as well as the outbreak of war in the east of Ukraine led to profound social, political and economic changes. The militarised society is facing a financial crisis and the rise of radicalism, in particular, of far-right forces.

Today, Ukraine remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. Labour migration to European Union countries (primarily Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) has become a mass phenomenon since 2015. The rate of migration has decreased only because of quarantine restrictions. The war also caused internal migration. As of 2021, about 1.5 million internally displaced persons from the country’s east have been registered.

Current Situation 


Ukraine has, since February 24th, 2022, been under siege. Due to the conditions of war resulting from the Russian invasion, we cannot at this time provide accurately validated and verified data and information on the current situation in neither Ukraine nor Russia.

The Russian regime is, through warfare, crackdowns and legislation, suppressing all independent and free media in both countries. This affects reporting by local and foreign journalists. The general media coverage is contaminated with propaganda.

As a result, we ask visitors to this site to be patient as we are steadily trying to provide validated and verifiable information on the war, its background and the role of far-right actors among those fighting in this conflict.



The change of power resulting from the 2013-2014 Euromaidan protests, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation, as well as the outbreak of war in the east of Ukraine led to profound social, political and economic changes. The militarised society is facing a financial crisis and the rise of radicalism, in particular, of far-right forces.

Today, Ukraine remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. Labour migration to European Union countries (primarily Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) has become a mass phenomenon since 2015. The rate of migration has decreased only because of quarantine restrictions. The war also caused internal migration. As of 2021, about 1.5 million internally displaced persons from the country’s east have been registered.

Public attitudes in Ukraine remain extremely polarised. Although Volodymyr Zelensky won the 2019 presidential election with 76% of the vote, and Servant of the People, the President’s party, formed a mono-majority in the parliament, the ruling team has lost popular support over the years. There is also a significant regional division in support of pro-Western and pro-Russian political forces. Since 2021, a radical change in Zelensky’s politics towards a more authoritarian governance model has been observed. An extrajudicial system of sanctions based on decisions of the National Security and Defense Council is used against political opponents, their businesses and controlled media.

Despite a notable increase in the number of human rights, feminist, and LGBT+ initiatives supported by Western institutions, the human rights situation in Ukraine remains difficult. Hate crimes are almost never investigated. The activists face daily obstruction of their activities, including attacks by the far-right. Nationalist rhetoric is normalised in society, and the change of power in 2019 did not affect this.

While the problems of some social groups are widely represented in the media thanks to the work of non-governmental public organisations, others remain marginalised. The members of the Roma community remain the most vulnerable group. In the same way, xenophobia towards Russians is normalised, which is justified by the continuing conflict in the east of Ukraine and the threat of a full-scale war.

Status of the far-right in the country

Status of the far-right in the country

Euromaidan protests and the outbreak of war in the east in 2014 contributed to the country’s significant growth of the far-right. The ultra-rightists gained considerable moral authority as Maidan participants and war veterans, while a weakened version of nationalism became the dominant ideology. During the war years, the far-right also gained military experience, access to weapons, positions in the security services and the opportunity to receive grant funding from the state for their own projects.

According to the Marker monitoring group, there were 81 cases of far-right violence in Ukraine in 2020. Groups most at risk of attack include representatives of those opposition political forces, which the far-rightists consider to be pro-Russian; the LGBT+ community; the feminist movement; representatives of youth subcultures; leftists; anti-fascists; and journalists. The peak of far-right activity typically occurs during nationwide political events, such as parliamentary, presidential, or local elections, and the months of Pride.

The largest far-right group in Ukraine is the Azov Movement. It includes the National Corps party as its political wing, the Azov National Guard Regiment as its military wing, and the Centuria organisation (called National Vigilantes until 2020) as its street paramilitary wing. Many other groups and organisations are also part of the orbit of the National Corps. Andriy Biletsky, the head of the National Corps party, leads the movement.

Other vital actors include the All-Ukrainian Union “Freedom” (Svoboda Party), the Right Sector, the Basics of Future (former C14), and others. Despite the electoral failure of the nationalists, who united around the All-Ukrainian Union “Freedom”, in the 2019 parliamentary elections (the bloc gained 2.15% of the vote and did not enter the parliament), the party has mayors in three regional centres Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil and Khmelnytskyi, as well as one deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, elected in a single-mandate district.

Ukraine was also a place of emigration for neo-Nazis from the Russian Federation who had taken a pro-Ukrainian stance in the conflict. Some of them served at the front as members of the Azov regiment. Among them are Sergey Korotkikh (Botsman, Malyuta), Denis Kapustin (“Nikitin,” “White Rex”), Alexey Levkin, Mikhail Shalankevich, and others.

Most far-right groups do not openly conflict with each other, although a division of interests is observed. The National Corps is the recognised hegemon of the far-right scene, mostly focused on violence against political opponents from among the pro-Russian opposition. However, its members often join the radical actions of other, smaller groups. Smaller far-right organisations, especially those focused on street violence rather than on the political movement, also actively cooperate with one another. The most notable cooperation in 2021 was between the Basics of Future (former C14), the National Resistance, and the Tradition and Order/Ukrainian Flag.

Status of antifascists in the country

Status of antifascists in the country

The active use of pseudo-antifascist rhetoric by Russian propaganda and the myth of the Great Patriotic War (a propaganda interpretation of WW2) as the basis for the separatist movement in the Donbas have significantly discredited the antifascist movement, which had not been numerous even before 2014. Today, the representatives of the Russia-oriented oligarchic parties speak in the name of anti-fascism. Both far-right and patriotically-minded public figures emphasise that anti-fascism is, in fact, nothing more than a pro-Russian position. From their point of view, only Kremlin admirers can talk about the ultra-right in the country.

Despite this, there are anti-fascist groups in Ukraine that have recently become increasingly active. They join street rallies organised by both leftist and liberal movements (March 8, LGBT+ Pride), arrange actions of solidarity with anti-fascists from neighbouring countries, and organise direct actions against neo-Nazis. Nevertheless, the monopoly on street violence still belongs to the ultra-right. Their mobilisation potential far exceeds the anti-fascist potential. They can count on impunity for violent actions, patronage from deputies and officials, as well as the mainstream press, where a national-patriotic consensus prevails. This allows the media not to talk about ultra-right violence, especially if it is aimed at unpopular social groups. 

Historic Developments

Historic developments

Key moments in the development of the nationalist movement generally coincide with key political events in the history of independent Ukraine.

Before the events of the first Maidan in 2004, the far-right movement was extensive and influential.

The most prominent right-wing radical organisation of the 1990s was UNA-UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian People’s Self-Defense), whose members participated in the Transnistria conflict, the wars in Georgia and Chechnya. They also became the basis of the power bloc during the Ukraine without Kuchma mass protest campaign 2001. The protesters demanded that the then President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, be removed from power. As a result of the confrontation with the police, many members of the UNA-UNSO were arrested and imprisoned for several years. The organisation never resumed after that, although it still exists today formally.

Another powerful nationalist organisation, the All-Ukrainian Union “Freedom” referred to as the Svoboda Party, has radical right-wing roots. It arose due to a rebranding of the Social Nationalist Party along with some significant weakening of its rhetoric. In 2003, during the presidential elections that ended the first Maidan, Svoboda supported the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko. The leader of Svoboda, Oleh Tyahnybok, has been remembered for his anti-Semitic statement, which was broadly propagated by the pro-government media, made at an action in support of Yushchenko. Nevertheless, this even helped Svoboda become the country’s leading nationalist organisation.

During the parliamentary elections in 2012, Svoboda received the highest level of electoral support among explicitly nationalist Ukrainian political forces over the whole independence period – 10.45%, having won 37 seats in the Verkhovna Rada.

The main event that brought the far-right movement from the margins was the Euromaidan and the beginning of the war in eastern Ukraine in 2013-2014. The most prominent right-wing organisation during Maidan was the Right Sector. It became a symbol of the radical wing of the protest and united quite a few people who had not previously identified themselves with nationalism. However, the Right Sector failed to convert its popularity during the Maidan into political capital and lost its leading position after a couple of years, giving way to the Azov Movement.

Azov (and the National Corps party later) eventually became the most recognisable far-right organisation in Ukraine due to its active participation in combat operations during the first years of the conflict, its far-right ideology, recruitment of members of the football fan movement, and purposeful work to create its myth, including in the West. In some aspects, Azov became the regional leader of the movement. Overall, Maidan made nationalism the dominant ideology in Ukraine’s humanitarian policy, normalised far-right political forces, and allowed far-right organisations to establish a monopoly on street violence.

The normalisation of the far-right after Maidan and their entry into civil society also imposed certain restrictions, forcing them to form their media strategy intelligently. While in the 1990s and 2000s, far-right violence was often subcultural and directed against visible national minorities and anti-fascists, the strategy has changed significantly since 2014. Today, attacks on people because of skin colour are extremely rare, as well as anti-Semitic attacks by organised far-right groups. The main targets have become their political opponents (predominantly pro-Russian forces or those whom the far-right refers to as such), marginalised ethnic communities (Roma), LGBT+ activists, feminists, and leftists.

The most violent attacks over the past few years were:

– The 2015 far-right attack on the Equality March (Kyiv Pride), which turned into a mass beating of participants. A law enforcement officer was wounded in the neck by a homemade grenade explosion;

– protests at the Verkhovna Rada on 31 August 2015 against the adoption of constitutional amendments regarding the special status of the Donbas, which were necessary to implement the Minsk agreements to end the war in the east of Ukraine. As a result of the use of a live grenade, 157 people were injured, and three members of the National Guard were killed;

– The murder of writer Oles Buzina in 2015, ​​allegedly committed by two members of the far-right C14 organisation (renamed the Basics of Future);

– a series of Roma pogroms in 2018, culminating in the murder of 24-year-old David Pap and the stabbings of his family members. The pogroms were started by C14 members, who destroyed a temporary Roma settlement in Kyiv, after which the initiative was picked up by other rightist organisations in various Ukrainian cities;

– An attack by members of the National Corps on a bus with members of Patriots for Life in 2020. They stopped the bus on a highway and shot with traumatic weapons.

International relationships

International relationships

Ukrainian far-rightists have always maintained ties with like-minded people from neighbouring post-Soviet countries. Until 2014, there was a common field of interaction between the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian far-right, united by concerts and the friendship of football fan groups. More respectable right-wing organisations such as the Svoboda Party also tried to build international relations, in particular by meeting with members of Marine Le Pen’s National Front, Viktor Orban’s Fidesz Party, Jobbik, and other European right-wingers.

2014 was a turning point for the Ukrainian right, as nationalists from different countries’ sympathies were divided between support for Ukraine and Russia. Some contacts with parties that supported Russia were lost, and one of the main tasks was to promote a pro-Ukrainian position. Today, the main promoter of Ukraine on the international far-right scene is the Azov Movement and its political wing, the National Corps Party. Olena Semenyaka is responsible for international relations.

The National Corps’ strategic political goal is to build an Intermarium—an interstate association of countries between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea based on conservative values that would cut Russia off from Western Europe. The Intermarium Support Group, which regularly holds international conferences hosting right-wing politicians and experts, was created to promote the idea.

Another strategy for the Azov Movement is to involve international ultra-rightists in fighting on the side of Ukraine. During the active phase of the war in the Donbas, groups were active in Western Europe to recruit far-right fighters for the Azov Battalion. When the intensity of the conflict declined, and Azov was withdrawn from the front lines, its main activity became military training. Thanks to the Azov members’ access to weapons and military training grounds, Azov became a military hub for far-right activists from around the world. Today, however, this direction is no longer as active.

Azov helped some ultra-rightists move to Ukraine. These primarily were Russian and Belarusian neo-Nazis, but also several citizens of the United States and Western Europe. The emigration from Russia was also facilitated by a wave of prosecutions undertaken by Russian security services against neo-Nazis in criminal cases since the 2000s. The absence of a language barrier, long-standing personal contacts, and a historical pull of ties between movements in neighbouring countries made this emigration quite comfortable. One of the most prominent Russian far-right activists who joined Azov back in 2014, Sergey Korotkikh (Botsman), explicitly called for all Russian far-right activists to move to Ukraine. In his words, “anything was possible” there. Some right-wing emigrants from Russia, such as the organiser of far-right MMA tournaments Denis Kapustin or the leader of the M8L8TH band Alexei Levkin, also use their connections in Europe to popularise the Ukrainian far-right.

Political Landscape

Political landscape

The far-right parties are barely represented in the parliament. The All-Ukrainian Union “Freedom” (Svoboda Party) had the greatest electoral success in 2012, winning 37 seats in the Verkhovna Rada. In the 2020 elections, the united bloc of nationalists won only 2.15%, failing to cross the 5% electoral threshold. Only one representative of Svoboda entered parliament under the majoritarian system. These results can also be explained by the fact that mainstream political parties adopted nationalist rhetoric after Maidan. However, the nationalists still have good positions in local councils, mostly in Western Ukraine, and Svoboda representatives are mayors of several cities, including three regional centres.

However, the influence of the ultra-right on political processes through street control far exceeds their electoral successes. The peaks of far-right violence traditionally occur during election campaigns. In some cases, the far-right has occupied the city or regional councils, pressuring the deputies and demanding that they make certain decisions. They also situationally cooperate with parliamentary parties, propose draft laws, participate in joint protests, harass opposition politicians, and disrupt their events. They are generally perceived as an influential political force with significant mobilisation potential, which no other political party has.

The National Corps party and the Azov regiment were traditionally associated with former Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, who held the post from 2014 to mid-2021. Avakov’s connection to the leader of the National Corps, Andriy Biletsky, can be traced even further back to the time when Avakov was a politician in Kharkiv and Biletsky was the head of the Kharkiv neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine organisation. Avakov’s son also has friendly relations with Russian neo-Nazi Sergey Korotkikh (Botsman), who joined the Azov Movement.

The nationalist forces in Ukraine mostly claim to be in opposition. However, the nationalists gained several ministerial portfolios in the post-Maidan government and the post of deputy speaker of the Verkhovna Rada. Subsequently, most of the nationalist ministers lost their positions.

The position of the National Corps can be described as politically flexible. During the 2019 presidential elections, they staged a massive campaign against incumbent President Petro Poroshenko, who was trying to remain in office for a second term. Members of the National Corps harassed the President during his tour and disrupted election meetings. Poroshenko built the campaign around the nationalist slogan “Army. Language. Faith”, while the patriotic community considered his opponent Volodymyr Zelensky nearly an agent of Russia. However, starting in 2020, especially in 2021, a confrontation between the National Corps and Zelensky’s new government began to take shape. It became especially noticeable after Interior Minister Arsen Avakov resigned and went into public opposition.

The main goal voiced by the ultra-right is to “prevent revenge” in the political and military dimensions. Militarily, this means rejecting attempts to resolve the conflict in the Donbas peacefully, particularly in the Minsk format, which the nationalists call capitulation. The ultra-right consistently advocates militarisation and rejection of the special status of the Donbas. They call for a ban on troop withdrawal from the front lines and the adoption of a law on collaboration instead of an amnesty law, etc. On the political level, they call for the elites ousted in 2014 to return to power. Therefore, the main opponents of the far-right are the pro-Russian opposition and its sympathisers. Most of the recorded cases of violence were aimed at representatives of pro-Russian parties, NGOs, or journalists who represent media controlled by pro-Russian politicians.

Another important topic for the ultra-right is the struggle for “family values”, which includes a confrontation with feminist and LGBT+ initiatives. This topic was actively raised both by traditional nationalists and street neo-Nazis from relatively small organisations. Attacks on feminist and LGBT+ conferences, marches, and film screenings rank second among all cases of far-right violence recorded in Ukraine.

Media Landscape

Media landscape

The far-right forces have no influential media of their own. Nevertheless, the hegemony of nationalist discourse in Ukraine allows nationalist messages and hate speech to circulate freely in the media space, especially when it comes to supporters of pro-Russian political forces, ethnic Russians, or people who live in the uncontrolled territories in the East of the country. As commentators or studio guests, leaders of far-right movements regularly appear on leading TV channels. The most frequent media guest is the leader of the National Corps, Andriy Biletsky, but members of far-right street organisations are also often invited, for instance, to discuss attacks on LGBT+ events or the Roma pogroms.

After the VKontakte social network was blocked in Ukraine and Facebook became severely censored, Telegram became the main information platform for the ultra-right. On Telegram, the far-rightists publish videos of training sessions, attacks on opponents, information about left-wing and LGBT+ activists, and coordinate information campaigns. Katarsis, the most popular far-right Telegram channel, has nearly 30,000 subscribers.  The channel administration regularly organises cyberbullying campaigns. Over time, Katarsis has become a source of information for reputable media outlets.

As a rule, official telegram channels of right-wing organisations do not contain overtly neo-Nazi content, or it is presented in a veiled form. However, there is constant interaction and re-linking between radical and moderate Telegram channels, which clearly indicates ideological and organisational ties.

Financial Landscape

Financial landscape

It is difficult to establish the sources of funding for far-right parties and movements. At the beginning of the war in eastern Ukraine, volunteer battalions (not all of them ultra-right) were often financed by big businesses and oligarchs. For example, the Azov battalion was funded by businessmen Serhiy Taruta, Ihor Kolomoisky, and Roman Zvarych. Since Azov became part of the National Guard, the regiment has been financed from the state budget.

Political parties in Ukraine mostly do not explain the sources of their funding. This also applies to the nationalists. As a rule, funds are contributed by individuals and presented as private contributions by party members. But these people are mostly not occasional members who contribute small amounts. They are related to each other or are figureheads whose real income is too small to make substantial contributions to party accounts. While unlike most political parties, the nationalists (the National Corps party, Svoboda Party) have a developed network of cells, as research by the Chesno project shows, the National Corps uses a similar system of raising funds. This is confirmed by former members of the organization.

The far right also derives income from security companies they have created. These companies, in particular, guard industrial enterprises or construction sites, especially if there is a conflict of interest between owners or between a developer and the community. Such companies can provide services not only to protect businesses but also, on the contrary, for raider attacks.

The ultra-right actively use their status as combat veterans to create non-governmental public organisations, which receive funding from the government’s social programs. These programs are primarily the rehabilitation programs of the Ministry of Veterans and the national-patriotic education program of the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine. Almost all organisations applying for grants for national-patriotic education are nationalistic or openly ultra-right-wing.

Another way to make money and legalise paramilitary structures is their participation in municipal guards. Such structures have been created at the initiative of some city mayors, particularly in Kyiv. In fact, they duplicate the functions of the police, although formally, they have much less power. Members of the Municipal Guards often come from the far-right milieu, and their activities are politicised and take on a nationalist direction. In addition to material support, this allows them to gain access to special police forces and to act on behalf of the law.

There is much speculation about the funding of the Ukrainian far-right from abroad, in particular, by the Russian Federation. This opinion is based on the formal coincidence of conservative right-wing rhetoric (anti-feminism, homophobia) with the conservative policy of the Russian leadership. Since the topic of Ukrainian nationalists is actively used by Russian propaganda, radical ultra-right actions are often called planned actions by the Kremlin to discredit Ukraine.

There is also an important precedent of cooperation between irreconcilable opponents. In 2010, the Svoboda Party allegedly received money from the pro-government Party of Regions, although it was in stiff opposition to it. In this way, the Party of Regions wanted to somewhat enhance the visibility of the nationalists to strengthen their pseudo-antifascist rhetoric. However, Svoboda denies receiving money from the Party of Regions.

Despite regular statements by public figures that the Russian Federation funds the ultra-right, there is no evidence yet. In most cases, it is more realistic to believe that the ultra-right movements are financed from internal sources, based on the conversion of the power capital they have acquired into economic capital.


Quarterly Reports

Quarterly reports give in-depth insights into the most pressing recent social and political developments in each country as they pertain to the local far-right networks and their international allies.

Ukraine - January 2022
Ukraine - January 2022

The ultra-right and the war
Since the beginning of the year, the main topic of Ukrainian politics has been the escalation of relations with Russia due to the concentration of troops near the Ukrainian border and the possibility of a full-scale invasion, fully covered by the Western press. The aggravation began back in 2021, but it did not draw much attention from the far-right at the beginning. Sceptical assessments of the possibility of a full-scale war with Russia dominated in most of the far-right online sources. A similar situation with the concentration of Russian troops on the border in April-May 2021, which never developed into anything bigger, had an impact. However, the situation changed in January, and many far-right organizations actively joined the military preparations.
The most active in this account is the National Corps. The National Corps began establishing a system of Defense Headquarters in all regional centres of Ukraine, where it attracted both its own activists and veteran volunteers, already after the spring aggravation of 2021. These headquarters have no legal authority, yet the National Corps insisted that the local authorities should incorporate them into the city’s territorial defence system. The Total Resistance initiative was created as a supposed alternative to the official territorial defence. Today, all of these initiatives and parallel structures have intensified.
For example, regular military training sessions attended by hundreds of people are held at the Atek factory (a ruined enterprise that was taken over by the National Corps through dubious methods and became the main base of the Azov Movement in Kyiv). Leader of the National Corps Andriy Biletsky took part in the round table “Unity of the People. Protection of Democracy. Defense of the State” together with many famous Ukrainian politicians.
Other far-right organizations, such as the Carpathian Sich, Freikorps, the Right Sector, and others, also conduct military training and mobilize their activists.
In January, the YouTube channel of the most odious Russian neo-Nazi and member of the National Corps, Sergey Korotkikh, also came to life after a long pause. In his videos, Korotkikh talks about the basics of guerrilla warfare against the Russian military.
In general, we can conclude that the threat of war plays into the hands of the ultra-right and allows them to return to big politics, mobilize their own assets, and attract new supporters.
Rebranding of Tradition and Order
Tradition and Order, an organization that is known for numerous attacks on the LGBT+ community, feminists, and left-wing activists has split into several organizations. On January 19, an official presentation of the Conservative Party, a new project of former Tradition and Order leader Bohdan Khodakovskyi, was to have been held. However, the presentation was cancelled due to the aggravation on the border.
Another part of Tradition and Order joined the organization Ukrainian Flag led by Christian Udarov. The activists of the Ukrainian Flag have now begun to actively intervene in Kyiv’s developments and the activities of certain private businesses. There is a high probability that the actions of the Ukrainian Flag have more financial than ideological motivation. Honour versus the National Corps
National Corps vs Honor
In January, the conflict between representatives of the National Corps and its former members, who founded their own organization, Honor, continued. The conflict began in 2020 because of different positions on the case of the nationalist Serhiy Sternenko, whom Honor supported, while the National Corps did not. The conflict quickly turned into a violent confrontation on both sides. An 18-year-old member of Honor was attacked in the clash. Also, the leader of the organization Serhiy Filimonov (aka Son of Perun) reported that his family home and the apartment of another Honor activist Ihor Potashenkov (aka Malyar) were attacked. At night, red paint was sprayed at the windows and a severed pig’s head was thrown into the yard. Later, unknown persons, probably members of the National Corps, burned down the organization’s vehicle.

Ukraine - December 2021
Ukraine - December 2021

Key Developments

In December 2021, a series of anti-Semitic incidents of vandalism happened in Ukraine, specifically, the overthrow of Jewish Hanukkah candleholders displayed in public places during Hanukkah celebrations. The first case of vandalism took place in Kyiv and was not connected to the activities of the ultra-right. A man tried to destroy a Hanukkiah that was set up for the holiday in the centre of the city. The incident received a lot of publicity, so his actions began to be imitated both in Kyiv and other cities very soon. It can be argued that we are talking about planned vandalism involving the ultra-right in the majority of incidents. In some cases, vandals left anti-Semitic inscriptions or stickers. A total of seven such cases occurred.
*Street violence *
November 2021 in Ukraine was marked by a large-scale right-wing campaign against music and entertainment venues in Kyiv’s Podil that openly proclaim their progressive stance. The HVLV bar, where right-wing radicals beat up the windows and pepper-sprayed two security guards, was under the most pressure. In December, the campaign continued in Lviv. On December 11, about 20 right-wing radicals tried to overthrow the LGBT+friendly Neutral party held at a club in Lviv. They blocked the entrances and attacked the visitors who had to flee. Most of the victims decided not to apply to the police, fearing that the case might turn against them. According to those who did file a report, they found condemnation rather than moral support from the police.
On December 20, right-wing radicals from the Ukrainian Flag group used shovels to apply a pile of manure in front of the entrance to Collider club in Kyiv’s Podil, calling it “club substances”.
Another action of the Ukrainian Flag was a rally at the Kyiv City Administration, in which they used live sheep. The rally was condemned by animal rights organizations. This is not the first case of the use of live animals by the ultra-right during their actions, despite the zoo-protection agenda that they declare.
Funding of the ultra-right from the budget
In December, it was reported that two festivals organized by the nationalists received generous financing from the budget. Dontsov-fest, dedicated to the ideologist of the Ukrainian integral nationalism, who professed Nazi and anti-Semitic views, took place in Zaporizhia and Melitopol on December 4-5, 2021. The Ministry of Youth and Sports allocated 380,000 UAH (13,000 EUR) for the event. Earlier, the same organization had received 410,000 UAH (14,000 EUR) to hold the Halchev Fest in November 2021. Both festivals went basically without an audience as they were attended solely by the organizers. There is an obvious conflict of interest between the organizer, Ukrainian Studies of Strategic Research organization, and the grantor side.
The struggle for “family values”
The National Corps party held a conference to present its own bill on combating “LGBT propaganda”. A similar draft law had already been submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the ruling Servants of the People party, so the National Corps declared the party was ready to cooperate with its authors. This initiative is indicative, because before, despite its blatantly ultra-right-wing ideology, the National Corps had not been very active in the struggle for “family values”. This field was occupied by other, marginal far-right organizations and movements, while the National Corps focused on mainstream political struggles. Nevertheless, members of the National Corps were involved in disrupting events organized by the LGBT+ community, as well as made homophobic and anti-feminist statements. So these ideas have always been part of the ideology of the party.
On December 18, HERETIC FEST II, organized by the leader of the Wotanjugend movement, Russian neo-Nazi Alexey Levkin, was held in Kyiv. NSBM (National-socialist black metal) bands from Ukraine and Poland took part in the festival, and the headliner was Levkin’s band M8L8TX. In a short video from the festival, you can see people using the Nazi salute.

Ukraine - November 2021
Ukraine - November 2021

Key developments

The Right and the Political Mainstream
At the moment, a broad coalition against incumbent President Volodymyr Zelensky is being formed in mainstream politics. The main role in its formation is attributed to the richest man in Ukraine, Rinat Akhmetov, and the National Corp party, which supported Zelensky’s accession to power, but later moved into opposition to him. The former Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, who recently returned to Ukraine and sharply criticized the President’s office, can also be considered one of the leaders of the anti-government coalition. Avakov has always been considered to be a patron of the National Corps, so we can state that his bond with the party has been restored. The leader of the National Corp, Andriy Biletsky, as well as other prominent politicians who have now gone into opposition to Zelensky, have also appeared on one of the country’s main talk shows on Ukraine 24, a channel owned by the oligarch, Rinat Akhmetov.
At the same time, a flash-mob for people posting pictures of the inscription “Zelensky is a dickhead” (“Зеленський хуйло”) spray-painted on the walls has been going on in far-right Telegram channels for two months now. The inscription refers to the insults that are usually applied to Vladimir Putin.
Struggle on the street
The main street activity for the far-right in November was the campaign against entertainment venues in Podil, the youth district in Kyiv where such venues are concentrated. On November 6, right-wing radicals from the Basics of Future (“Основи майбутнього”, formerly C14), the National Resistance (“Національний спротив”), the Ukrainian Flag (“Національний стяг”, a breakaway from the Tradition and Order), and other right-wing groups conducted a so-called “crusade against drug addicts”. They tried to get into the HVLV bar, known for its support of the LGBT+ movement, as well as for the fact that Antifa once worked there as security. They failed to get into the bar as the guards had closed the gate to the courtyard. Then the right-wingers went to popular nightclubs, such as Closer and K41, famous for their rave parties, and continued the “crusade” at their doors. The police did not interfere with the action of the ultra-right.
This was not the end of the campaign. On November 15, the ultra-right stormed the SHOOM club, confusing it with Closer, and spray-painted some Nazi graffiti, including the inscription “Death to the Left”. They also beat up a well-known Kyiv artist.
On November 26, the ultra-rightists carried out a second attack at the HVLV bar. This time they managed to neutralize the guards with gas canisters and telescopic batons and got into the courtyard of the venue, where they broke all the bar windows and sprayed gas into the room. After the attack, 12 far-right activists were detained by police. Many HVLV supporters came to the police station in order to force the opening of criminal cases against the attackers. The leader of the ultra-right organization The Basics of Future (ex-C14) Yevhen Karas also arrived at the police station to facilitate the release of his comrades. Well-known neo-nazi from Russia, which currently lives in Kyiv, Denis “White Rex” Kapustin also took part in these events.
On 28 November, about 80 ultra-right activists blocked the entrance to the K41 club, disrupting an event there.
On November 29, a protest was held by about 300 members of the Podil community and people sympathetic to the HVLV bar (all representing different political views) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, demanding an investigation into the attacks and holding the district police department leadership accountable for inactivity of the police. As many protesters are convinced, the police are in cahoots with the ultra-right. About 60 far-right activists came to the rally and tried to silence the speakers.
Cyber-bullying remains among the main activities of the far-right. Authors of the Katarsis telegram channel, which has over 25,000 subscribers, regularly publishes the identities of LGBT+ people, feminists, or simply those who are not patriotic enough from their point of view. Such publications are followed by a campaign of harassment of these people, resulting in the deletion of social media accounts, dismissal from jobs, termination of contracts, and other consequences for the victims.
International cooperation:
On November 1, the members of the German far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) came to Ukraine to meet Victor Medvedchuk, the head of the pro-Russian opposition party Opposition Platform for Life (OPFL). German part was represented by three members of AfD: Petr Bystron – the member of the Bundestag Committee on Foreign Affairs; Maximilian Krah – deputy of the EU parliament; Ulrich Singer – deputy of the Bavaria federal parliament.
Since in Ukrainian politics OPFL represents itself as a main antifascist party, which fights against Ukrainian nationalists, this meeting is quite controversial. The members of OPFL’s paramilitary wing, organization Patriots for life, were repeatedly attacked by the Ukrainian far-right. At the same time, both parties share a conservative agenda and sympathy for the Russian government.
The National Corps or rather the Intermarium Support Group, headed by Olena Semeniaka, remains the most active in building international relations. The most intense cooperation at the moment takes place with the rightists from Poland. On November 22, there was an online conference “Migration Crisis is a Hybrid Kremlin Armory,” dedicated to the situation on the Poland-Belarus border. It was attended by experts from Ukraine, Lithuania, and Poland, as well as by leaders of the National Corps. Even before that, the National Corps had sent an official letter to the Polish Foreign Ministry with an offer to come to Poland and help in the fight against the refugees.
A large neo-Nazi concert Heretic Fest is scheduled in Kyiv for December 18. It is organized by a neo-Nazi from Russia Alexey Levkin, the leader of M8L8TH band and the Wotanjugend gang. NSBM (National-socialist black metal) bands from Russia, Ukraine and Poland will take part in the festival.

Ukraine - October 2021
Ukraine - October 2021

Key developments

UPA March
On October 14, the traditional Ukrainian Insurgent Army (abbreviated UPA from Ukrainian “УПА” or “Українська повстанська армія”) March took place in Kyiv, the main event of the year for Ukrainian nationalists. Since 2015, this day has been a state holiday, “Day of the defenders of Ukraine”, previously celebrated according to the Soviet tradition on February 23. This year, about 5,000 participants representing both nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations took part in the march. The march was attended by All-Ukrainian Union “Freedom” (Svoboda party), the National Corps, Centuria (a paramilitary formation within the Azov Movement), the Right Sector, Dmytro Korchynsky’s Bratstvo (“Brotherhood”) party, and others. Representatives of the National Resistance, one of the most active far-right organizations in the street, walked in a separate column with a banner “White lives matter”. Their second banner called for the death of “all enemies”, such as Putin, Soros, the left, LGBT, the European Union, etc.
On Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square), the capital’s main square, participants of the rally from the National Corps burned an effigy of a clown symbolizing President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a former comedian and actor. In this way the National Corps once again declared its transition to the opposition to the current government.
A group of young people from the LGBT+ community who had chosen to participate in the march were also attacked during the rally. Despite the Ukrainian flag and the UPA flag, which they carried, the company was still attacked because of the rainbow symbols. The Ukrainian branch of the international neo-Nazi network Blood And Honour claimed responsibility for the attack. That night, the attackers also posted a photo of them with a Totenkopf symbol flag saluting Sieg Heil in front of the Independence Square.
Street Politics
In October 2021, Irpin, a satellite town of Kyiv, became a hotbed of anti-Roma actions initiated by the ultra-right. According to the far-rightists themselves, the reason was a conflict between an employee of Military Coffee Pavlo Polishchuk and Roma teenagers who attacked him. Military Coffee is a chain of coffee shops owned by a well-known far-right activist, one of the leaders of the Basis for the Future organization (former C14), Andriy Medvedko. Medvedko is also a key suspect in the murder of writer Oles Buzyna in 2014, but the courts in that case are de-facto frozen. Polischuk is also an active supporter of C14 and a member of one of its branches.
On October 17, more than a hundred far-right activists marched through the town to Roma houses, where they staged a rally with torches and anti-Roma slogans. The nationalists also launched a public campaign against a local councilwoman who criticized the actions of the ultra-right. On October 20, members of C14 and the Right Sector met with the councilwoman in person and publicly insulted her. In 2018, it was with the pogrom of the Roma settlement on Lysa Hora in Kyiv, committed by members of C14, that a series of Roma pogroms began throughout the country (8 incidents), ending only after the murder of David Pap during the pogrom near Lviv.
On October 16, the SSU (Security Service of Ukraine) reported the detention of 3 people responsible for attacks on collection trucks in 2016. The gang, which had close contacts with Azov, committed a series of attacks from 2014 to 2016. The gang consisted of eight people, three of whom served in the Azov battalion, and four others were mercenaries from Russia and Latvia. In 2016, there was an attempt to liquidate the gang, during which two members of the gang were killed in a shootout with law enforcement officers, two were detained, and three more managed to escape. They had been hiding from the police at a military base in the Donetsk region near the front line for almost 5 years, using the names of dead fighters or fighters who had been released from service. An arsenal of weapons was seized from the detainees, which included firearms, in particular, a machine gun and grenades.


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