Introduction

This text provides an overview and background to what we understand as the “far right” from a global perspective. The far right is a threat to democracy, equality, and universal human rights and sits in power in many countries, both in coalitions and on their own. The far-right stands to gain ground in numerous local and national governments and the supranational European Union in 2024. In the European Parliament elections, far-right parties are expected to receive more votes than ever. India, the largest democracy in the world, is under threat from the Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP, the Hindu nationalist party that has encouraged violent attacks on Muslims and introduced racist legislation.

Far-right political parties, social movements, think tanks, media, and extremist violent groups wield an increasing amount of power and now have a direct impact on policymaking, thus eroding human rights and people’s quality of life globally. These effects can be seen in changes to citizenship rights, austerity measures, unequal access to welfare and the public sector, and securitisation and criminalisation of migration and disability. Keeping victims of conflict and wars on the “outside” is a high priority for the far right and has also been normalised globally. Far-right parties are largely nationalist but have a plethora of ways of collaborating internationally and with non-parliamentary groups. They capitalise on social media to spread their ideology through other extreme groups and individuals. Since September 11, 2001, the far right has contributed to a normalisation of the criminalisation of migration and securitisation of borders, largely policed by private companies. Security and deportation centres have since developed into a profitable sector that collaborates across borders (Fekete, 2019).

Rise of the far right in global politics 

Since the 1960s, the Western world has experienced a value shift that has become a focus of far-right research. A growing number of people who attended university developed liberal values on gender, sex, and culture. Voter volatility increased, and new movements and parties emerged, such as Green parties and feminist parties and movements. Economic growth, increased living standards, and greater economic freedom encouraged this change in political attitude. People who did not benefit from economic growth disapproved of the value change felt threatened by it, and developed economic grievances. Economic grievance theory argues that the poorest, the “´losers´ from globalisation – provide the strongest support for authoritarian values”(Norris and Inglehart, 2019, p.132). Hence, according to some political scientists, support for both populist and authoritarian values is strongest from the poorest strata with insecure or precarious jobs. These parties were never dominated or led by working-class politicians and leaders. With the exception of a few, leaders have been recruited from wealthier strata and have taken it upon themselves to speak on behalf of the people. Much research has focused on elections and has often relied on opinion polls and big surveys, which will only give us a part of the picture. It is important to take into account the agenda-setting power of corporate elites, politicians, the media, other parties and pressure groups. The working class is diverse, and voter abstention among the poorest segments of the population is widespread. In France, the UK and the US, support of the far right is most likely from wealthier groups (Mondon and Winter, 2021). In the UK, after Brexit it was largely assumed and reported by the media and academics that Brexit had happened due to the working class vote in the deindustrialised North East and old mining communities. It was only later revealed that voters from higher socioeconomic groups held most Brexiteers. The abstention rate was 58%. Research has also shown that most working-class voters did not vote ´leave´ because of concerns over immigration but because of political alienation and that the Labour Party no longer defended their interests (Telford and Wistow, 2019). 

The far right is present in government coalitions in several European countries. The main coalition partners are principally mainstream conservatives that have long co-opted racist, anti-immigrant ideas and policies. They are often backed by strong non-parliamentary movements and increasingly violent pressure groups that challenge the ideal of equality and democracy and actively attack multiculturalism and human rights. The list of “backsliding” democracies is long, with Hungary, Poland, and the USA maintaining an unwavering presence. The UK has also shown signs of backsliding in terms of strengthening the executive branch, trying to control the judiciary branch, and exhibiting a disregard for the law under Boris Johnson. Israel currently has the most extreme right-wing government coalition in its history, and according to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in January 2024, it has genocidal intent and has now killed over 33,000 Palestinians in retaliation to the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023. The US, UK, and Germany have been reluctant to denounce this genocide and continue to provide weapons to the Israeli army. Germany is being taken to the ICJ by Nicaragua for war crimes and for providing weapons to the Israeli army. While Israel’s extreme brutality cannot be considered typical of the global far right, current violence and electoral mismanagement in India are cause for concern. Since 2014, Narendra Modi´s Hindu nationalist BJP has encouraged attacks on Muslims and mosques. In this time, Hindu violent extremists have killed thousands of Muslims and inflicted widespread property damage to Muslim homes. Since the second BJP government, violence has escalated dramatically, and in at least five states, JCB bulldozers are now used to demolish people’s homes (Amnesty International, 2024). In March 2024, the new Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) became law in India. It offers amnesty and citizenship to undocumented immigrants of religious minorities from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, but Muslims are exempt. The law violates the country’s constitutional values on equal rights (Ellis-Peterson, 2024). 

Nativism, populism, and authoritarianism are defining elements of the BJP (Leidig and Mudde 2023). In that sense they are like European far right parties. However, to understand the BJP’s success, anti-colonialism and neoliberalism also need to be considered. Under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership, the party has become more radical in its promotion of Hindu nationalism and in its campaign to create a Hindu ethnostate.  

Middle—and upper-class support for the far right and neoliberalism are more defining features of parties in the global south than in the north. In the north, parties are more likely to promote protectionism and welfare chauvinism.

Radicalisation and violent movements are on the increase globally. In the US alone, in 2018, the number of white nationalist groups increased by nearly 50% to 148 from 100 (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p.19). The groups are resourceful and creative in how they get their message across on- and offline, how they move from different chat rooms, and how they combine different ways of communicating. Miller–Idriss documents how they increasingly use mainstream cultural spaces like gyms, cafes, fitness clubs, mixed martial arts, schools, music, clothing brands, churches, football stadiums and gun shows.

On 6 January, 2021, President Donald Trump refused to accept defeat in the US Presidential election and encouraged a right-wing mob to attack Congress. A similar scenario unfolded in Brasilia in 2023, as President Bolsonaro also refused to accept defeat to left-wing Lula da Silva. Bolsonaro’s supporters attacked the Congress, the presidential palace, and the supreme court before being stopped by the police (Sullivan, 2023). 

The broad appeal and reach of the far right

The far right is a broad and international force, with movements and parties across the globe. Links and communication between international groups have always existed, to varying degrees of effect. While the roots of the term “far right” can be traced to the Bolshevik Revolution, its modern usage was defined by Cas Mudde (2019) to refer to parties and movements on the right of the mainstream. This broad term is split into two subgroups: “extreme right” and “radical right.” The radical right includes parties that may accept parliamentary democracy and engage with it, while the extreme right rejects democracy. The two are often strongly linked, and divisions can be blurred. Radical right parties often challenge democracy while claiming to protect it from “elites,” whom they blame for destroying democracy and freedom of speech through cancel culture and political correctness.

In several Western European countries, radical right parties grew out of the remnants of their fascist predecessors. Examples of this include France, Italy, Austria, Sweden, and Germany. However, the most successful radical right parties are those that could persuade the electorate they had broken from their fascist past. Germany has been hailed for its strategy of “Vergangenheitsbewältugung,” which can be translated as “coming to terms with the past” and specifically refers to denazification (Harrison and Bruter, 2011). This was long seen to be a reason radical- and extreme-right parties were largely unsuccessful in Germany until Alternative Für Deutschland (AfD) was founded in 2013. AfD is an example of a successful radical-right party with no fascist roots or links, as it began as a protest party against the EU and its proposed solutions for the economic crisis. Over time, the party has become much more extreme, benefiting greatly from the racist, anti-immigrant PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West) social protest movement that acts as a feeder group. The AfD has not lost support due to its radicalisation. On the contrary, it won its first local election in June 2023 in Sonnenberg, Thuringia and the first mayoral election in December  2023 in Pirna in Saxony, where the AfD candidate got 38.5 per cent of the vote. Both Thuringia and Saxony are eastern states(McGuinness, 2023). In the middle of January 2024, the German journalist network Corrective uncovered that the AfD had met with neo-Nazi leaders and sympathetic business people in November 2023 to collaborate on a plan for the mass deportation of immigrants. These revelations sent shock waves through Germany, and before the end of the month, more than 1.4 million had participated in demonstrations against the AfD (Le Monde, 21 January, 2024). This mobilisation of civil society might have had an impact, as the AfD subsequently lost to a candidate from the CDU (a mainstream right party) in the district of Saale-Orla in Thuringia (Connolly, 2024). 

Is it possible that denazification did not work after all? Mahmood Mamdani (2001) argues that denazification did not go far enough and that the focus was on individuals, not the system. After World War II, citizens who were formerly active in the Nazi party were welcomed back to positions in industry and politics once they declared their support of the new democratic constitution. In Italy, virtually no systems for “coming to terms with the past” were set in place. The far-right Italian Social Movement (MSI) was founded by fascists and held a position in parliament already in 1946. There were many right-wing groups in Italy after the war, with militant members drifting in and out of the MSI, but the MSI was unchallenged when it came to elections until the 1990s. (Kitschelt, 1995, p. 164). 

Until the1990 the MSI was beset with internal conflict and factionalism, problems with legitimacy, and violent extremist members linked to terrorist groups. Students and young people inspired by the Nouvelle Droite in France joined the MSI in large numbers in the 1970s and demanded to take part in Italian society to challenge the mainstream right, as well as the entire party system (Francois, 2014).   Internal conflicts, however, hampered their attempts.  It took until the early 1980s before the MSI was invited by the socialist prime minister Bettino Craxi to take part in public meetings with anti-fascist leaders. The MSI leader, Giorgio Almirante, was also invited to the communist party headquarters (Ignazi ,2003, p.41-42). Ideological differences plagued the party.  It was unable to renew itself ideologically, and the MSI became more and more irrelevant until the 1990s. On the back of the collapse of the entire party system due to a corruption scandal where all other parties were involved, the MSI found an opportunity to show they had not been implicated but had clean hands.´ They contested elections in Rome and Naples, and even though they did not win, they got more than 40% in both cities and won the mayorship in four provincial capitals and 19 municipalities.  Before the national elections in 1994, Silvio Berlusconi praised the MSI and invited them into a coalition (ibid). Berlusconi was a media magnate, and Donald Trump was compared with him decades later in the US because of his flamboyance and rhetorical style. The endorsement of the MSI by Berlusconi encouraged Fini to create the new umbrella organisation ´Alleanza Nazionale´, which soon became the name of a new party that replaced MSI and declared it had broken with its fascist past. To what extent a break from fascism happened is still contested, and Griffin argued in 1996 that the leadership were still committed to core fascist values (1996).

The modern far right’s acceptance of parliamentary democracy and radical right parties entering parliaments took place in Europe mainly in the 1980s and 1990s. That was at the height of neoliberalism in an era that Cas Mudde has called the “first significant wave of far-right politics in Western Europe” (Mudde, 2019, p.16). Many of these parties have since been accepted by the mainstream throughout Western Europe. After the end of the Cold War, Eastern Europe followed the Western trends. Heightened immigration and emigration, loss of jobs and identity due to economic hardship, and increases in precarity and inequality as countries transitioned from communism heightened conditions for grievances.

The first parties that gained representation in elections in Western Europe that had clear roots in fascism were the Front National (FN) in France and the Alleanza Nazionale (AN) in Italy. These parties succeeded by emphasising issues with migration and a poor economy but were still often labelled as anti-immigration, single-issue, or protest parties. However, many were able to implement strategies to make them appear more mainstream and electable, largely by convincing the electorate they had broken with their fascist past and expelled violent extremists (Art, 2011). 

Some far-right groups, like the “progress parties” in Denmark and Norway, which began as neoliberal anti-taxation parties, and had no fascist pasts. Most were internally split between factions that wanted political representation or to stay in opposition. Mainstream government and media in most countries refused to acknowledge or collaborate with radical right parties and operated with a cordon sanitaire, a barrier to exclude them from public debate or politics. As the far right gained popularity, keeping them excluded became increasingly difficult. In 1983, France’s FN gained nearly 17% in local elections in Dreux, and the mainstream right struck a deal with them, signalling to the electorate that they were not too extreme to vote for. FN´s success led to a ripple effect throughout Europe and soon became a model for other European far-right parties (Hainsworth, 2008, p.32). The FN was led by a  populist in Jean-Marie  Le Pen, who had been chosen to lead the party instead of the more intellectual candidate Megret. He was very charismatic and plain-speaking and managed to get simple messages across, like blaming immigration for unemployment for the French. As the cordon sanitaire was lifted, Le Pen appeared in the media. The mainstream right legitimised the far right by welcoming them into coalitions and co-opting their policies. They ushered in an era of far-right success in Europe.

Mainstreaming of the far right

Mainstreaming of anti-immigration and co-option of ideas by the mainstream has a long history in Europe. In the 1980s, most far-right parties were against the EU, even if they seemed to promote the same neoliberal-oriented economic policy nationally. Welfare chauvinism and strong controls of immigration were for several of the far-right parties added later. Neoliberalism was a driver for welfare state retrenchment. Austerity measures eroded the welfare state and often introduced new conditionalities, making it harder for people to access welfare and benefits.  Even in the universal Scandinavian welfare states, equality was no longer the ideal. Austerity measures brought on by the mainstream right encouraged far-right populist forces to appeal to those affected by precarity and poverty, to turn them against the “elites” who had abandoned them. 

At this time, Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister in the UK, Helmut Kohl Chancellor in Germany, and Ronald Reagan the President of the USA. Privatisation of public assets, roll-back of the welfare state in the UK, demonisation of people who depended on the welfare state, and criminalisation of immigrants ensued. In the 1970s, skinheads and fascists were visible on the streets in urban Britain, and the British National Party (BNP) gained support. Leading up to the 1979 elections, Thatcher co-opted the BNP´s stance on immigration and declared on TV that people were right to worry about “being swamped by immigrants from the Commonwealth” (Jackson, 2022 p.48). In 1972, nearly 30,000 Asian Ugandans settled in Britain after being expelled by Idi Amin. British fascists were beaten in the polls in 1979 but were well connected with others in the USA, Canada, Australia, and other countries (Jackson, 2022). 

International collaboration is not new. The first Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) was introduced by Ronald Reagan in  1974 and has successfully constructed transnational networks. CPAC evolved from a small yearly meeting in the US to a network that organises regular global festivals of radical conservative ideas. Israel, Hungary, Australia, Mexico, Brazil and South Korea have all hosted these events.  The first European version of the conference was hosted by the Center for Fundamental Rights in Budapest, Hungary, in 2022. It was repeated in 2023 and again in 2024 when Hungary is boasting of providing a unique platform when they welcomed ´allies ´ in North and South America, Europe, Japan, Israel and Australia.  Orbán, on opening the festival in Budapest, stressed the need to unify forces to counter neo-Marxist and the threat to Western Civilisation. The conference is guarded by security staff with metal detectors to keep the Left out. The slogan ´Woke Free Zone ´ was greeting participants in Budapest in 2023, and many journalists were refused entry (Heilbrunn, 5 June 2023). 

The far-right benefits from a commercial press, where favourable reporting maximises support. An increase in online and offline collaboration and more joint efforts to join forces globally are often done through social media. Radical politicians that “sell” are often used, regardless of whether or not they hold a formal position. For example, Nigel Farage, the previous leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), commented on the EU more frequently than any other politician, and he continues to be a popular media figure. In the run-up to the referendum, Farage was also a regular guest on the ´Today´ programme, Radio 4 and had been one of the most regular guests on  BBC Question Time since 2010.

In 2016, the UK’s departure from the European Union in the form of Brexit provided ample fodder for the global far right. Marine Le Pen and Donald Trump used it to boost their presidential campaigns, and Nigel Farage, former Leader of the UK Independence Party, is still a favoured guest in the US. In February 2024, Liz Truss, the ultra-conservative former British Prime Minister who only held the office for 49 days, spoke at the CPAC in Maryland. Tommy Robinson, the high-profile previous leader of the extreme right street group EDL (English Defence and League) and criminal convicted of contempt of court, public order offences, and financial and immigration fraud, also spoke at CPAC with no disapproval from Truss. Truss founded the UK organisation Popular Conservatism (PopCon), which posits the need to “take back control” to ensure people who vote for conservative parties “see the policies they support enacted” (Runciman, 2024). Truss, who is still an MP in Britain, has come under intense criticism as she remained silent as she took part in an interview with Steve Bannon during her visit to the US. Bannon hailed Tommy Robinson, which she did not dispute. Truss also said she had to resign as MP due to a plot by the ´deep state´ (Stacey,  27 February, 2024).  

The links between the radical right and the extreme right have become increasingly blurred, as the links the far right has forged with- and the co-option of far-right demands by the mainstream right have also contributed to changing the character of the far right globally and nationally (Renton, 2019). 

Over the past 30 years, the breakthrough stigma attached to supporting the far right has mostly disappeared, and no age or social group seems to be immune to voting for them. More men support the far right than women, and a large amount of support is derived from working-class voters.  However, this gender gap has closed in several countries, such as  France, where the FN emphasised a strategy of de-demonisation where the aim was to make the part look less extreme during Marine Le Pen’s campaign (Ivaldi,2016, Mayer, 2013). In Italy, Giorgia Meloni stepped into power in October 2022 and has since led the most right-wing government since 1946. 

However, having women leaders or giving the false impression of being moderate is no guarantee the gender gap will completely close for the far right. In Scandinavia, the gender gap still prevails despite most far-right parties having been led by women for decades. The radical right parties in Denmark and Norway, historically the DPP (Danish People´s Party) and the FrP  (Progress Party) in Norway have also always been moderate, which often helps attract the female vote. Research on the gender gap has suggested that women are more concerned about collective solutions to social problems than men and not so focused on law and order. Class is also less salient among women (Coffé, 2018, p.209). 

The global far-right tends to defend ´traditional values´, gender roles and the nuclear family and does not accept that LGBTQ+ people exist. The far right is also largely opposed to inclusive legislation and equal rights for women and LGBTQ communities. The Brazilian ex-president Jair Bolsonaro said he would rather see his son dead than homosexual, and Rishi Sunak, the British Prime Minister, said a man is a man, a woman is a woman, that is just common sense´ (Mc Donnell, 2024). Except, in several Western and northern European countries, the far right has embraced LGBTQ+ rights and women’s rights as their own- and as core democratic values that need defending from an external threat. They use racism, femonationalism and homonationalism to combat sexism and argue immigrants, especially Islam, pose a threat to Western culture and democracy (Delphy, 2015, Farris, 2017).

Globally, the far right has become bolder and more radical over time with endorsement by mainstream and social media and the normalisation of inequality, nativism, and racism. What passes for “normal” rhetoric in 2024, used by Viktor Orbán, Jair Bolsonaro, Donald Trump, and Rishi Sunak, would only have been considered the domain of the far right in the 1990s. 

The criminalisation of poverty, migration, and migrants (asylum seekers specifically) is the global norm in 2024. Whilst the far right started off as neoliberal, they have largely turned protectionist and nativist in the sense that they prioritise protecting the interests of native-born inhabitants over immigrants´ rights and demands. An example of a country that previously upheld universal welfare that has taken protectionism and nativism the furthest is Denmark. The far-right Danish People´s Party supports a minority right-wing coalition that developed a dualist welfare state in 2001-2011 and 2016-2019, with different access and benefits depending on immigration status. Since 2001, welfare chauvinism with inferior welfare provision to immigrants has been normalised. New legislation was passed in parliament and supported by the majority. In 2019, the Social Democrats won the elections on a welfare chauvinist and anti-immigrant platform (Wiggen, 2023). Denmark was the only European country to declare Syria safe for the return of asylum seekers in 2019; in 2016, they sent a cross-parliamentary delegation to Australia to study offshore detention centres; and in 2022, Denmark agreed to explore the deportation of asylum seekers to Rwanda. A similar Rwanda scheme has become a prestigious project in the UK for the increasingly radical right Tory party. “The Tory party has lost the plot,” says The Guardian columnist John Harris ( 8 April, 2024). 

Crises and catastrophising

The far-right has successfully set their agenda and found ample opportunities for tapping into people’s fear in the economic crisis of late capitalism (Wodak, 2021). Much attention is given to how economic crises deliver a boost to these parties and movements – even in countries where the effects of global economic crises have been minimal. This could be observed after 9/11, in the 2008 global economic crash, and during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The intensified fear inherent to crises causes people to worry not only about losing financial assets but also boosts concerns about culture, immigrants, and societal changes with a yearning for a fictional past where things were “better.” Radical right parties are careful not to appear as openly racist but have long focused on culture and how “other” groups pose different demands and lifestyles that pose a threat to national culture, which is largely portrayed as homogeneous.  

At the height of the 2015 refugee crisis, mainstream media, including the left, had embraced far-right rhetoric and policy changes to restrict cross-border movement and non-citizens’ access to welfare. In the UK, the Labour Party boasted a mug with the caption, “controls on immigration – I´m voting Labour.” The Labour think tank “Labour Together,” which was launched in 2017, is shaping the new direction of Labour. It has modelled itself on the centre-right think tank “Onward”  and receives funding from hedge fund managers. (Courea, 2023). Brexit and the refugee crisis provided a big boost to support and growth of the far right. By 2016, the Swedish government gave in to the Sweden Democrats – a party with fascist roots – and closed its borders to Denmark to stop the flow of refugees. In Denmark, citizens were arrested for transporting refugees, and Norway built a fence on the Russian border and deported refugees back to Afghanistan.  In 2024, Norway’s centre-left government will continue the harsh policies of its predecessor and deport vulnerable refugees. 

The far-right has long been seen as experts on tailoring and exaggerating a crisis to their needs through the use of rhetoric, social media, and deploying conspiracy theories to encourage fear (Wodak, 2021). During the COVID-19 pandemic, It was difficult to convince people through simple rhetoric and conspiracy theories that Jews, Muslims, Israel, the CIA, China, George Soros, and the UN could be responsible for the virus. Despite the spread of conspiracy theories, some of which reached the mainstream media, and street demonstrations led by anti-vaxxers, the far right largely failed to convince an electorate that largely trusted their own government’s handling of the pandemic. Conspiracy theories and racist rhetoric still contributed to an increase in hate speech, vandalism, and hate crime. 

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the far right failed to coordinate and develop a comprehensible response to the crisis and lost mainstream and government support in Europe. In the US, on the  other hand, Trump did not reject QAnon´s alternative reality and dismissal of scientific knowledge (Betz, 2021). . In most liberal democracies, governments were more trusted in handling the crisis than the far-right opposition. The far-right blamed globalisation and the European Union (EU) but missed the opportunity to blame immigration for the crisis as lockdown was imposed nearly everywhere (Camus, 2020). That did not stop them from blaming immigrants and minorities for spreading the disease and attacking governments for enabling that to happen. As most European countries locked down and closed their borders, Sweden kept primary schools and borders open. Chief Immunologist Andres Tegnell, who advised the centre-left government, declared that ”In Sweden, we stay at home when we are ill,” a neoliberal approach with focus on personal responsibility.  Unfortunately, this resulted in many infected workers who did not show signs of illness going to work and continued to spread the virus. Young care workers were the first to grasp the link between themselves and the spread of the virus. Lack of personal protective equipment and a system in which people often work part-time across multiple nursing homes was an ideal environment in which the virus could spread (Wiggen, 2020). The Sweden Democrats called for lockdown and stricter measures, but the Social Democratic/Green government was embraced by the global far right for their bold approach and strategy of herd immunity. Sweden was becoming a darling of the far right, an example that pervaded anti-mask and anti-lockdown protests globally.” Health authorities were also left largely uncriticised, even by the increasingly nationalist left. The cult of Anders Tegnell, with its bizarre manifestations including fawning articles, tattoos, food, clothing, and even Christmas decorations depicting an angelic Tegnell, is part and parcel of this nationalist outpouring that has helped to solidify support for the Public Health Agency among leftists. (Göranson and Loubere, 2023 ) 

Eurocentrism in far-right research 

Research on the far right tends to focus on individual countries and has often missed the global connection. Movements and parties belonging to the far right have a long history of global connection and mobilisation that needs more attention. 

Since 1983 and 1984, when FN gained mainstream acceptance in France by winning 10.9 % in the European elections, there has been an abundance of research on the phenomenon. The consensus is that the parties furthest to the right are considered a threat to democracy. 

Researchers have looked at explanations for success in demand- and supply-side factors for the rise of the far right, as well as how parties´ links to fascism and Nazism impact how likely people are to support these parties, how parties have prospered due to economic and ideological changes during economic crises, immigration, and grievances has been studied to explore how these events created new opportunity structures. Researchers have looked for “winning formulas” in external and internal factors to understand the appeal and success of the parties. For example, since the 1990s, with the increase in European integration, far-right parties began focusing on anti-globalisation and opposing the EU, calling for protectionism and welfare chauvinism (Mayer, 2021). 

Mayer warns against relying on massive surveys, and data sets on elections as they tend to underrepresent voters from lower socioeconomic groups who are most likely to support the far right. Research on the far-right electoral base has become a minor industry, and voters are reluctant to admit in surveys that they have voted for or will vote for the far-right (Mayer, 2021, p.23). This likely played a role in how the media misjudged the outcome of both Brexit and the 2016 presidential elections.

The 2008 recession and austerity measures led to an increase in research on how the economy impacts the far right. At this time, there were already more publications on the far right than on any other movements and parties, and academic interest remains strong (Mondon and Winter, 2021, p373).

Research on the far right has been criticised for methodical nationalism, analysing social phenomena limited to nation-states and national issues rather than how these parties and movements link on an international scale (Estrada Campos). Far-right research has also been largely focused on Europe and has failed to shine a light on issues in the global south, including, for example, the long history of far-right power in India. In South America, extreme-right military dictatorships were in power and supported by the mainstream right of the USA and Europe until the 1980s. Far-right networks continue to have an impact in South America today. In Brazil, the far right sees the environmental protection of the Amazon as a “plot by a globalist ideology operating from former colonial metropoles to take over Amazon” ( Estrada Campos, 2021, no page). There is much to learn from far-right regimes that were recently in power in Southern Africa to understand the role of the far right in settler violence.

Conclusion

Since the 1990s, the European far right has grown and been part of the political landscape.  It now takes closer to 15% of the vote, with several countries voting at a much higher percentage depending on the election. The far-right has gradually become part of mainstream party systems due largely to the failure of the mainstream left and right. The failures of the left lie in not offering an alternative to neoliberalism and austerity measures and in mainstream conservatives co-opting the politics of the left. Not only did mainstream political parties agree to form coalitions with them, but they also co-opted far-right ideology and policy recommendations, often as a strategy to win elections and save the coalitions they were once in. The far-right has long been part of the mainstream, particularly in Hungary, Poland, Austria, Norway, Italy, and, lately, Sweden. Denmark has also played a key role in shaping welfare chauvinistic policies as a backup party to minority conservative government coalitions for more than ten years. The normalisation of far-right ideology has had a direct impact on policy change, for example, on immigration and citizenship rights. Kaltwasser argues that the right’s influence permeates the ”political landscape with its preferred policies and illiberal rhetoric, something that affects not only the rights of historically marginalised groups but also key institutions, such as constitutional courts, regulatory agencies and supranational bodies that bolster multilateralism” (2024 p.6).

In the last 15 years, the far right has also increasingly become part of the global political landscape. In the early 2000s, the mainstream right agreed that multiculturalism had failed and further aligned themselves with the racism and rhetoric from the far right.  Centrist figures like David Cameron, the previous British PM and Angela Merkel, the previous Chancellor of Germany, both agreed that multiculturalism had failed despite evidence that most countries experienced an increasing acceptance of immigration and multiculturalism among younger and increasingly more liberal generations. Across Europe, the majority do not rate immigration as a problem or demand policies that restrict immigration; that pressure comes from the top and from the far right (Mondon and Winter, 2020). 

Politicians, far-right activists and the media have ideologically driven demonisation of migration and asylum seekers. The political debate around any issue that requires public funding seldom focuses on rights and human dignity. Immigrants are seen as a burden, and concerns over their economic potential, contribution, or cost are high on the agenda in most states´ immigration policies. The far-right has largely won the battle against refugees, and we now see a global migration system where movement is criminalised and international human rights are ignored even in Scandinavian countries that have historically been the most inclusive, equal, and tolerant welfare states. There is a global political consensus that unequal treatment of immigrants and refugees abounds and that even backtracking on equality legislation and human rights is rampant, and welfare chauvinism is standard.  It is concerning that human rights are disregarded not only by the far right but also by the mainstream in government in countries that are not characterised as ´backsliding democracies´.  Welfare chauvinism is not only driven by cost concerns but also by the idea that refugees are not genuine and that they research welfare states before deciding where to go. Less universal welfare provisions and a ´hostile environment´ are actively used to deter people from seeking asylum in a climate where migration is increasingly criminalised and unregulated.  Attacks on labour rights, human rights and changes in legislation do not only affect refugees and asylum seekers but also other minority groups that experience an increase in discrimination and criminalisation of disability, for example. These are big political challenges of our time where a broad communal effort is needed to counter the influence of the far right.

References & Further Reading

• Amnesty International (2024). India: Authorities must immediately stop targeted demolition of Muslim properties- new reports. Available online: here.
• Art, D. (2011). Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
• Balázs Göranson, M., Loubere, N. (2023, November 19). Jacobin. available online: here. 
• Betz, H.G (2021). QAnon: A Conspiracy of Our Time. 137-147.  Leidig. E. (ed.) The Radical Right during Crisis. Stuttgart. Ibidem Verlag.
• Camus, J.Y. (2021). Europe´s Far-Right Fails to Capitalize on COVID-19. 122-127. 
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